With the country dealing with economic decline and political uncertainty, some scholars are trying to find another way for Japan to relate to the world. Yoshihide Soeya, a professor of political science at Keio University and a member of several government councils, has been one of the leading proponents of a middle way for Japan. Soeya outlined his vision of Japan as a middle power staking out terrain between the great powers of the United States and China.
Central to his argument is the assertion that Japan itself is not and does not want to be a great power. ”Particularly in the domain of traditional security, where the military plays an important role, Japan’s role has not been that of a great power,” Soeya maintained. ”And there is nothing to suggest that Japan is moving in that direction. Some discourses in Japan might give you the impression that that is happening. But it is not taking place at the policy level.”
To illustrate this point, Soeya identified elements of middle-power diplomacy in Japan’s postwar policy. It provided economic assistance to Southeast Asia and China. It emphasized the concept of human security, which expands traditional definitions of security to include human needs such as food and shelter. And it labored long and hard within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.
That tradition continues today, he pointed out. ”Japan and Australia signed a joint security declaration last year,” Soeya related.
But there are no elements of traditional military cooperation. That’s natural for Japan and Australia, as middle powers. Soeya translated such middle-power diplomacy into a specific regional strategy in which Japan worked with other countries in the region to carve out a more autonomous space between China and the United States. ”Imagine Japan ganging up with Australians, Koreans, and Southeast Asian people and saying to America, ‘we like this, we don’t like this.’ They would create a regional order, and say to the Americans and Chinese, ‘that’s how we want to live and you’ll have to live with it.’”
Even as Japan articulates this middle-power diplomacy, however, it has been acquiring new military capabilities. U.S. instructors have trained Japanese pilots in air-to-air refueling procedures in preparation for Japan to receive new KC-767 refueling and strategic transport aircraft.
It has acquired Aegis ballistic missile defense systems, the F-2 Attack Fighter, and top-of-the-line battleships. It is developing a light air craft carrier. And it persuaded the Bush administration to sell the advanced F-22 Raptor stealth planes until Congress nixed the deal in August 2007.
Some politicians in Japan’s ruling party have advocated changes in the Japanese constitution, particularly the pacifist Article 9, in order to facilitate an overall beefing up of military capabilities and expansion of doctrine. Although Soeya pointed out that the Japanese constitution has not been amended since it was enacted in 1946, it has nonetheless been reinterpreted to give greater leeway for Japanese military exports or Japanese participation in ballistic missile defense.One key element of this debate hinges on the notion of ”collective self-defense,” which the Japan constitution currently rejects.
